This is a 2006 debate between Bart Ehrman and William Lane Craig on the the historical data for Jesus’ resurrection from the dead. It’s easily the best, highest level debate on the subject I’ve ever heard. It’s long–133 minutes–but worth listening to (very slowly). Part of the reason I think it’s so valuable is that Ehrman cogently raises legitimate historical problems with the resurrection in general (and Craig’s arguments in particular), and builds a compelling case against it; and that it offers about as informed a Christian response as one could ask for. The kind of argument that Ehrman makes is the same sort that is being taught to college students around the world and is (imperfectly) filtering into pop culture, and which regularly leads to the many Christians young and old to leave the faith. It’s the kind of argument that Christians need to become very intimate with if they’re hoping to seriously engage the modern skeptic, and of which the avoidance has irreparably weakened the applicability some recent treatments (I may offer a review of this book here at some point–I don’t like it). Ultimately, Craig fails to persuade, and I think his failure is emblematic of why so many folks leave: we haven’t come up with good responses to some valid(!) fundamental critiques of Christian faith, and often the responses we have either avoid the issues or equivocate. By response I don’t mean disproof, though in some cases that might be what we need; by response I mean a reasonable answer that makes sense of the faith-decisions we make over against objections.
As a historian, I’m more with Ehrman than I’m against him. At risk of spoiling the video, I think Christians need to, for instance, consider why we privilege one set of data over others, whether the resurrection is the “best” explanation, how trustworthy our documents are, and how literary/theological agendas in the biblical texts effect how we receive the information the purport to offer.
I have opinions on these matters, but I’ll hold my cards for the moment; I’m curious what you all think (that is, only after you’ve heard the debate–btw, don’t miss the Q&A, it’s prb the best part). But let me take the opportunity to recommend a great book: James D.G. Dunn’s _Jesus Remembered_, who doesn’t exactly answer the questions, but offers a model for handling the texts that I think ultimately does.
January 8, 2009 at 8:58 am
Sorry I’m like six months late to the game. I listened to this debate a couple years back, just after finishing seminary and was convinced that Ehrman won at the time. Reading it again a couple years later, I still think Ehrman won, but I understand and admire what Craig is trying to do (even if I think his goal is an impossibility).
Here are a few thoughts from the debate. Since I’m a moderate, who has been largely influenced by the Reformation, I naturally dislike evidentialist arguments, so I’m sorry if these points keep pressing that point:
1. Craig seems to think that if you rationally analyze all the data about God and Christ that you can’t help but believe in him for salvation. This frustrates me, because it undermines the work of the Holy Spirit and the affections in our coming to Christ. I agree with Wright, Ludemann and Dunn (whom Craig quoted) when he said that the empty tomb and the post-Easter experiences of Christ are fairly well grounded in history (I’d even agree with him, Wright and Dunn that this is the standard view among NT scholars). Still, where does that get us? As Ehrman pointed out, there are other naturalistic interpretations of the events, and there are other “possible” theological interpretations. Those points don’t prove that it is an historical reality, nor make it the most plausible conclusion from the data.
2. I’m a believer, but I think there is something shocking and irrational about the resurrection. It’s not supposed to make sense in terms of how the world thinks and the disciples obviously were rather shocked when it happened. We read all throughout the New Testament that it’s irrational (but true), so I don’t know why Craig thinks that something changed in the last 2000 years where we can now prove the event historically. Yeah, the resurrection makes sense of my understanding of reality, and answers many big questions that I used to have about life, but my convictions are a result of the Holy Spirit prompting faith within me, and not because I’ve made the most rational conclusion after assessing the data.
3. In terms of his theology Ph.D., Craig studied under Wolfhart Pannenberg. They remain friends and in contact. It’s not as though he was doing work on the resurrection under a conservative evangelical scholar who let him assume inerrancy, miracles, etc. I’m sure that the boys in Germany kept him straight whenever he tried to use standard apologetical arguments. Still, he studied the resurrection as a theologian, under a philosophical theologian. That’s where this discussion belongs. I believe the resurrection was a real, historical event, but it’s theological in nature and should be discussed in theological terms. This debate was over history, and therefore Craig’s theologically affected arguments failed.
4. If I weren’t a believer and were presented with a highly, complex argument that the resurrection had a probability of .97, I’d probably take the .03. Swinburne is an exceptional and highly respected philosopher, but it takes great faith to discard that .03, and I truly don’t think Craig realizes the importance of the Spirit in overcoming the .03.
5. Ehrman is not a philosopher, and makes really bad philosophical (and theological) arguments when he tries. He’s every bit as biased toward his agnosticism as Craig is in his faith, and whereas he is an excellent historian, his biases often lead him to make non-sequitur arguments when he moves into philosophy and theology.
6. This was a debate concerning history and the historical method, and was therefore right up Ehrman’s alley. Craig made some good points and brought up a few good retorts to Ehrman’s arguments (particularly when Ehrman tried to make a philosophical mistake). In the end, Ehrman knows Scripture every bit as well as Craig and knows the historical analysis, scholarly opinions, etc. better than Craig.
7. Craig’s best point was his conclusion where he shared his testimony. Why does Craig believe Jesus rose from the dead? It’s because he’s experienced the risen Christ and therefore has the confidence that comes as a gift of the Spirit.
8. Now, if they were to debate “God’s Problem” then Ehrman wouldn’t stand a chance because he makes outdated philosophical arguments and would be on Craig’s turf (like when he failed in his online theological debate with N.T. Wright). Ehrman seems like a cool guy and is very honest in his debates, but he’s not a good debater and comes across as really defensive and frustrated at times. His poor debate skills were clear whenever he debated Wallace and Holmes over “Misquoting Jesus” and was actually most critiqued by his teammate Dale Martin. He was trounced in that debate. Craig on the other hand is a great debater. Therefore, the fact that Ehrman won just makes it clear how much stronger his arguments were.
August 13, 2008 at 9:32 pm
JD – I’ll try to clarify my point.
You Said – I don’t see how one could calculate or estimate either an intrinsic probability or a probability conditioned on available data of a supernatural phenomenon like the resurrection without seriously begging the question.
If one cannot calculate the probability, then one also cannot calculate the improbability.
However, we can calculate the probability of the evidence fitting the explanation. An intrinsic (frequentist) probability or improbability is impossible; a probability conditioned by available evidence (Bayesian) is possible.
I feel the same calculability problem is also beholden to Ehrman’s claim that the resurrection is an “unlikely” explanation, though I don’t think one needs a calculated figure to know that it’s less likely than many other explanations. It’s self evident.
Here I am confused. By ‘self evident’ do you mean that it simple doesn’t feel appropriate? If so, based on what; perhaps on an assumption of naturalism? Or do you mean (as Hume and Ehrman do) that given any event “x” a miracle is less likely than a natural occurrence; because all similar occurrences have been proven to be natural? If you mean the former, then I can’t argue with a thing feeling wrong, I can simply say that I tend to share the feeling or tend to disagree – and admit it’s utterly irrational either way. If you mean the latter, then we have two issues; you are using a frequentist scale of probability to answer a question which doesn’t have a defined scale and you are begging the question.
A frequentist scale can only answer questions of things with totally predictable outcomes. The question of a rare event, such as how likely it is to win the lottery, is as discoverable as the question of “how likely is it to roll snakes eyes with dice.” This is because both have closed sets of numerical frequency. Rolling snake eyes with two die has a chance of 1 in 36 – a 6 digit lottery with ping pong balls numbered between 1 and 49, leaves us with a 1 in 13,983,816 chance of hitting all six numbers. In both cases we have a closed and finite set of possible outcomes and a random draw of numbers, so we can assign a frequentist probability. We cannot say this with the occurrences of an event “x”, because we don’t know how many times a similar event has occurred or can occur. We simple don’t have the information to assign a probability of this sort to say a claim of resurrection, because we don’t know for sure how many other deaths might have had resurrections after them. We simply can’t know it. Often when people say miracles are improbable they are using this sort of probability, which is utterly impossible.
The larger problem of question begging comes to a head between Lord Berkeley and David Hume. Hume begs the question when he writes…
“… It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event; otherwise the event would not merit that appellation…”
Since miracles have never been observed to happen in any age or country, then they are discounted. Given a claim of a miracle we know that it cannot have happened (since it has never been observed to happen)
In other words, since only the natural happens, then miracles cannot happen, so any claim of a miracle is really a natural occurrence, and since we have so many natural occurrences we are lead to conclude that only the natural happens. This is radically circular.
Lord Berkeley will do an opposite but equally fallacious thing. He argues that every event that occurs is a miracle, because God makes the mind and body to connect. So when trying to type, God is actually causing my thoughts to produce key strokes. In fact, if you claim that typing is a natural occurrence (a firing of synapses, for instance) Ol’ George will just respond that “Since all of human history leads us to know that everything is a miraculous undertaking by God, any claimed chance or natural occurrence must be ruled out since the weight of our experience of miracles leads us to understand that there can be no natural occurrences.” For Berkeley the resurrection is just a slightly less expected miracle then the dead staying dead; but both are miracles. So in Lord Berkeley’s estimation; miracles are uniform, so questions of the natural are obviously false. For Hume the experience of the natural is uniform, so questions of miracles are obviously unknown natural occurrences. Both are technically begging the question, even if we ‘feel’ that Hume’s argument more plausible intuitively, and Berkeley’s argument more credulous. Both have committed a logical fallacy and should be disregarded.
One way of illustrating this is to try to think up a miracle that is so spectacular it couldn’t possibly have a natural explanation. I contend it’s impossible to do so. Suppose someone claims to have died and been resurrected in the 21st century. We have 500 independent doctors who verify he is dead, we have another team of 500 to verify he is alive, we have DNA, fingerprints, retinal scans to show it’s the same man; insert as much evidence as you need or want. Anyone if so inclined can make outlandish natural explanations to do away with the concept that a miracle could account for the man rising from the dead. They could claim that all 500 doctors made a mistake on one side or the other; that the CIA could have forged retinal scans, etc…By the same token anyone can claim that any event is a miracle, even if there are natural explanations for it.
The Bayesian scale, however, can assess what might have occurred, or assign it some probability, but only within the evidence available. Now numerous explanations might be able to account for what has happened in our above case; but we can compare these to the evidence we have. Is it more probable that all the doctors made mistakes, on one side or the other, that 500 EKG meters simultaneously failed or that he actually rose from the dead? According to Bayes’ theorem it is more probable that somehow he actually died and then he actually rose from the dead because it more closely fits the evidence we have (although this is NOT CONCLUSIVE, like in frequentist probability scales.) It cannot, however, determine if the cause of this happening was God but it can at least argue that a person actually did rise, that natural law was violated (which is the definition of a miracle). It can do this because there is an absence of any explanation that better fits the evidence.
I am not familiar with Swinburne’s book, although I know he has done work on some of this stuff. Sorry for the manifesto, I swear Im not the philosophical Unabomber…
Pax Christi…Nick
August 13, 2008 at 7:31 pm
Nick:
Thanks for your explanation. Here’s part of my concern: I don’t know Baye’s theorem well—though I do know statistics—but I don’t see how one could calculate or estimate either an intrinsic probability or a probability conditioned on available data (much of which is contestable) of a supernatural phenomenon like the resurrection without seriously begging the question. I feel the same calculability problem is also beholden to Ehrman’s claim that the resurrection is an “unlikely” explanation, though I don’t think one needs a calculated figure to know that it’s less likely than many other explanations. It’s self evident. I don’t have access to Swinburne’s book, though I’d love to hear his argument if you can offer it (that is, unless it’s a hassle, in which case forget it).
Also, the illustration you give is interesting, but I don’t think it proves your point. All it demonstrates is that one can’t definitively exclude the resurrection as an explanation for the data. The probability may be very small, but it still can’t be ruled out. Ehrman agrees with that; he’d rather opt for a more likely explanation, though he’d concede that his choice is ultimately a statement of faith as ours is (though ours is less likely).
Momma: Ehrman does talk about the resurrection accounts as evidence one can’t trust the narratives. More interestingly, in my opinion, is that he wields this observation to directly question Craig as to whether he’d admit that these are contradictions or errors. Craig never bites.
August 13, 2008 at 6:50 pm
I was just relistening to the WHYY broadcast this evening and I had a thought.
I would LOVE to hear Enns debate Ehrman.
Bobby, make a phone call…
Nick
August 13, 2008 at 1:02 pm
John R,
I suspect the same. Neither side seemed all that interested in understanding the other which gives the debate a gamey aspect. At times during the debate I found myself wondering what was motivating the whole thing.
August 13, 2008 at 10:34 am
Never seen anything good from Craig before, wouldn’t expect him to start now. These kinds of debates are just publicity stunts. =/
August 12, 2008 at 9:51 pm
I’ve gotten as far as downloading the audio to my iPod. Next step is to listen. But, never fearing to jump in somewhat less than fully prepared, let me ask a question about the ascension accounts. How do they serve to corroborate (or not) the resurrection? It seems to me that it’s one thing to have one improbable event explained supernaturally, but two? Do Craig and Ehrman get to this? What about our panel of experts?
August 12, 2008 at 9:33 pm
Nick,
I agree with you that Craig is not a “textual [historical] scholar.” Problematically, he would disagree with you. He claims in the debate and all over the place elsewhere that he is a trained historian, especially in the area of Jesus’ resurrection. He talks and writes constantly about his PhD in studying the resurrection. So, this is why I certainly do not excuse his pseudo-scholarship when it comes to primary and secondary sources.
I hear you on the Ehrman-White debate. I have not decided whether I am dreading that or looking forward to it. James White is a, well, I do not want to say what I think of him here. Suffice it to say I would sound rather harsh : )…
August 12, 2008 at 5:08 pm
FTH –
This is the problem, Craig and others are not textual scholars. For the next train wreck I hear that Ehrman is debating James White, of all people.
That should be viciously pointless…
Pax Christi…Nick
August 12, 2008 at 4:55 pm
Just for fun, I cannot for the life of me figure out how Craig can claim that one of the “facts” not in dispute by “scholars” is/are Jesus’ post resurrection appearances.
This is a ridiculous claim. Most scholars outside some more conservative-ish (maybe not by our standards) Christian world would not accept that “fact.” Some might accept that the traditions of his post-resurrection appearances are somewhat early, but not that it is an indisputable “fact” that Jesus appeared (many times) after his resurrection.
This type of sloppiness with both primary and secondary sources marks much of Craig’s material in the debate, from my point of view. This was greatly disappointing to me.
August 12, 2008 at 4:16 pm
An interesting issue raised by the debate is that of reading the Bible as privileged. I don’t think it would be honest for us to say we don’t read the Bible differently than historical documents. We believe it is from God, how could we read it as we read Josephus? The key point, it seems to me, is that we want to be open to the Scriptural texts defining the kind of privilege involved rather than our imposing some pre conceived notions on to the text.
August 12, 2008 at 3:19 pm
Bobby –
You Said But then we turn back to the idea of multiply attested, independent, eyewitness sources. Do we have that for the resurrection? We have 4 Gospels. Many agree that the Synoptics are not fully “independent” of one another, or at least use a common source.
I think this is right and one of the mistakes Craig makes in the debate. The original pericopes probably have been copied numerous times in just the way ehrman suggests.
John’s Gospel is quite late. As Ehrman said, Paul doesn’t mention all of the ‘generally accepted historical facts’. So where are these early, independent sources?
They just dont exist anymore. If they were ever written sources to begin with.
Before you even get to probability, you have to look at the evidence. In the case of the resurrection of Jesus,the “evidence” does not satisfy “historical” criteria. It’s like asking if Constantine converted to Christianity? If so, was it early (c. AD 310) or later in his life? Was his conversion genuine? For political reasons (order, control)? These questions are not simply answered by looking at the data.
This is right. What we can do is assess probability to how various scenarios fit the evidence. This is the Bayesian probability scale we were discussing. I can ask; “Did constantine convert for political reasons or did he convert after seeing ‘in hoc signo vinces’ beneath a flaming cross in the sky?” I can assess this via probability scales. For instance if we had his authentic memoirs and they recorded that Constantine feared conversion would be a political disaster and if it had turned out he was right we might say conversion for political reasons was less probable than other explanations for his conversion.
Furthermore if we had multiple independant accounts of seeing the same thing Constantine saw in the sky, etc…then it is more probable he actually saw something then it is that he just made it up for political gain. Ultimately we will reach a place where the limits of our investigation cease and we just have to postulate our best answers. The finest examples of this today are found in quantum physics.
Eusebius shows clear bias and has a lot to gain from making Constantine look good. You have to take what he writes with a grain of salt.
Agreed, this evidence may make his claim to having a miraculous conversion less probable.
Is there historical evidence for the resurrection of Jesus? No. There is historical evidence that his followers believed in his resurrection. There is interpreted historical data that suggests that something happened concerning his body after his death. There is evidence that would fit resurrection as a theory. What more can we say (as historians)?
Well, good historians will stop here. Philosophers of history, however, will suggest a model to view this evidence and lead to a conclusion. A Mathematician or philosopher might suggest that such and such an explanation fits the facts more so than others (Bayesian probability)
Returning to your sample case, the real issue isn’t whether the person imploded, but what caused it? If we had video of Jesus after his death and burial, that wouldn’t be evidence of his resurrection unless you believed in resurrection. For another person, it would be evidence that he never died. Or another might say it is a look-alike. Evidence requires assessment. It may lead to answers, but the answers are not in the bare facts. [Yes, I used to be addicted to Law & Order: SVU]
This is precisely the point. We cannot assess probability to the answers behind the evidence we have, outside of saying such and such explanation either fits better or worse the evidence we have.
What ehrman wants to say is that a miraculous explanation is “less probable” then a non miraculous one – which is an equivocation on the meaning of probability.
Ehrman is a fine textual scholar, but he is a lousy philosopher…lol
Pax Christi…Nick
August 12, 2008 at 2:15 pm
You know Nick, I can go along with what you are saying here. But then we turn back to the idea of multiply attested, independent, eyewitness sources. Do we have that for the resurrection? We have 4 Gospels. Many agree that the Synoptics are not fully “independent” of one another, or at least use a common source. John’s Gospel is quite late. As Ehrman said, Paul doesn’t mention all of the ‘generally accepted historical facts’. So where are these early, independent sources?
Before you even get to probability, you have to look at the evidence. In the case of the resurrection of Jesus, the “evidence” does not satisfy “historical” criteria. It’s like asking if Constantine converted to Christianity? If so, was it early (c. AD 310) or later in his life? Was his conversion genuine? For political reasons (order, control)? These questions are not simply answered by looking at the data. Eusebius shows clear bias and has a lot to gain from making Constantine look good. You have to take what he writes with a grain of salt.
Is there historical evidence for the resurrection of Jesus? No. There is historical evidence that his followers believed in his resurrection. There is interpreted historical data that suggests that something happened concerning his body after his death. There is evidence that would fit resurrection as a theory. What more can we say (as historians)?
Returning to your sample case, the real issue isn’t whether the person imploded, but what caused it? If we had video of Jesus after his death and burial, that wouldn’t be evidence of his resurrection unless you believed in resurrection. For another person, it would be evidence that he never died. Or another might say it is a look-alike. Evidence requires assessment. It may lead to answers, but the answers are not in the bare facts. [Yes, I used to be addicted to Law & Order: SVU]
August 12, 2008 at 2:06 pm
Richard Swinburne employs Bayes’ Theorem to show that the likelihood of Jesus’ resurrection is a whopping .97! In other words, he claims that it is not rational to withhold judgment on the matter.
August 12, 2008 at 12:41 pm
JD –
In general you are correct; miracles are not useful explanations for historical phenomenon. We should generally assume a natural cause and effect scenario. My protest is that we cannot assign a frequentist probability to a supposed miracle, we can assign a Bayesian probability, but in this case the resurrection is actual fairly probable. The reason we cannot assign a Frequentist probability to the event is because this works only on things that have highly predictable outcomes; like coin flips or dice roles. If we do the latter (Bayesian probability) we are asking how an explanation fits the specific evidence. Since Historical analysis works much like forensic discovery I am going to use this as an example.
Suppose we discover a victim who is crushed in on himself. We begin to construct a picture of what occured at that scene. Barring any hard DNA or fingerprint evidence we might interview witnesses, look at motive and alibi, interrogate suspects, etc.
Suppose, however, that three witnesses who are independant of each other claim that they witnessed the victim spontaniously implode. Detective Moreland argues that someone must have a telekinesis to cause people to implode. Detective Craig invents a theory of spontanious human implosion, for which there is no known precedent, to explain the evidence. Of course detective Ehrman immediately rejects these explanations because they sound fanticiful. He aruges that these are less probable explanations then a clever murderer who made it look like spontanious human implosion/telekenesis.
Whose explanation do we accept? We might argue that Ehrman’s case is the most likely, but this is only because we assume a uniformity to the universe and are fairly biased towards unknown and new explanations. Technically, so far as Bayesian probability scales are concerned, they are all equally likely; because each explanation equally fits the scant evidence we have. Likely a case like this would go unsolved because of a bias towards uniformity.
Applying that to the resurrection we might argue that the preponderance of the evidence rules out various natural explanations. We cannot rule out a miracle a priori as “less probable” (this is what I am objecting to). What we can do is argue that the specifics of the case lean towards one or another conclusion, each of which are only as likely as they coorespond to the facts on the ground. This is what N.T. Wright has set forth in his “Resurrection and the Son of God.” A sustained Bayesian case that the explanation “Jesus rose” best fits the evidence we have.
On a side note I have the best natural explanation for the resurrection(IMO) if you are interested; but it still does not fit the evidence we have as well as the idea that Jesus rose.
Pax Christi…Nick
August 12, 2008 at 10:47 am
Bobby: Bigtime jealous here. I tried to arrange a similar event w/ Hays and Ehrman up here at Columbia. Didn’t work out–and I would’ve moderated! I like Ehrman.
Nick: Could you explain to me why miracles aren’t inherently less likely explanations of historical phenomena? I don’t think I follow. As a historian, if I learn of an event that’s described as miraculous in some sources, I’m obligated to consider possible explanations. That it really was a miracle is one, and technically there are infinite others. But given that I’ve never seen a miracle, that they’re extremely rare, that often what are ascribed as miracles are in fact naturally explainable phenomena, and that people make up miracles for all sorts of reasons, they shouldn’t be my first choice–that is, they’re less likely to be the correct explanation than something else. That doesn’t mean of course that miracles don’t happen or that they aren’t good explanations of some phenomena; it just means they usually don’t and aren’t.
August 12, 2008 at 9:47 am
Fellows
Craig’s approach is decidedly NOT the one Van Til would have approved. Cgaig, by the way ,is a Molinist and really out side the Reformed camp.
August 12, 2008 at 3:44 am
Full MP3 audio of this debate can be found here.
August 12, 2008 at 1:11 am
I’ve been gradually trying to phase myself out of this blog but I thought I might try to help this discussion along first:
Bill Craig repeatedly distinguishes between “knowing” and “showing” that Christianity is true. According to Craig, the Spirit impresses upon our hearts that Christianity is true, that’s how we know. On the other hand, evidences can contribute to the plausibility of beliefs, especially historical ones, that’s one way one might help show Christianity is true. Thus, Craig isn’t trying to “prove” anything to the believer or to the agnostic for that matter. What’s more, probability generally doesn’t set out to prove anything, it rather sets out to establish that something is more or less likely. Generally speaking, probability is used to give more or less support for a belief that something PROBABLY will happen (or PROBABLY did happen.)
Also, Craig isn’t just arguing that the probablity is high that the resurrection happened. He is arguing that the probablity is high that the resurrection happened GIVEN CERTAIN BASIC HISTORICAL FACTS THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN WIDELY ACCEPTED AS TRUE. No specific values have to be given in every case, the resurrection simply has to show itself comparatively highest amongst other explanations and be more likely to have happened than not to have happened GIVEN THAT OTHER EVENTS HAVE DEFINITELY OCCURRED. The strategy is pretty straightforward and is not all that mathematical in the present context. The Bayesian equation helps philosophers evaluate such things as whether GIVEN THAT CERTAIN THINGS HAVE ALREADY HAPPENED some other thing has most probably happened.
Presumably, a reasonable person will favor a belief that is more probable than its negative.
Cheers.
August 12, 2008 at 12:55 am
JD –
This is the problem –
“That’s ultimately why he adopts a different interpretation of the data, one that is, strictly speaking, more probable–one that doesn’t involve miracles which are inherently improbable.”
Miracles are neither probable or improbable, they have a null probability value; unless you are talking bayesian probability, in which case they are just as likely as any other explanation that fits the evidence as well.
I understand what Ehrman wants to say; its similar to other atheistic arguments about miracles in that it assumes naturalism in order to do science. As a general assumption this is necessary, but as a non transferrable heuristic it becomes as equally probable as a universe where all happenings are miracles (e.g.. Lord Berkeley). In other words we can assume a uniformity to the universe to do science, but we cannot rule a priori that “X” event is necessarily naturalistic because it is “more probable” then the “less probable” miracle explanation. We can do one of two things. (1) Draw no conclusion to causation (this is ultimately what Hume does) or (2) assign Bayesian probabilities to various explanations (this is what Craig seems to be doing).
Pax Christi…Nick
August 11, 2008 at 11:31 pm
I read the transcript from this debate a few months after it happened. Oddly, I picked it up again a couple weeks ago and read it in its entirety.
Having taken Ehrman’s Intro to the NT class at UNC and spent hours with him at the Armadillo Grill I am very familiar with his take on things.
I’m going to say that Ehrman runs away with this debate. The actual title of the discussion is “Is There Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus?” Craig’s task, to affirm that there is “historical evidence” is a difficult one. There is “historical evidence” to be sure, but Ehrman is correct in saying that there are many ways of understanding the evidence.
Honestly, I don’t understand why we (Christians) want to “prove” the resurrection so much (or feel the need to discover the ‘real Mt. Sinai’ for that matter). I am convinced of it, but my conviction is one of faith. This is not to say that I do not find arguments for the resurrection helpful, or even necessary. I do fear that we often foster faith in our systems and proofs at the expense of our faith in Christ.
My favorite part of the debate is how Ehrman exposes the weakness of Craig’s initial assertions (like the early and multiply attested eyewitness material), and yet Craig just repeats those assumptions without answering Ehrman’s challenges (and then accuses Ehrman of the same thing).
A close second is the use of a mathematic equation to calculate the probability of the resurrection (though he assigns no values to the components of the equation).
Most disturbing to me is Craig’s “I see no reason whatsoever to think that it is improbable that God raised Jesus from the dead.” If that is so, then it is not a miracle, and not that special.
At the end of the day, I’m left with John 3. It is the work of the Spirit that produces faith and belief in the resurrection of Christ, not mathematical equations of probability or even historical evidence.
August 11, 2008 at 11:12 pm
Things get more interesting as you go on–again, listen to the whole thing first. I have to admit, I thought the probability calculus was ridiculous and wholly dubious. But then again, I’m a historian…
Just as a point of clarification–it took me a while to get this so I thought I might explain it at length. I’m positive Ehrman doesn’t mean that the resurrection can be ruled out as a possible explanation (Craig says he’s duplicating Hume’s argument and Ehrman then explains he’s not and how he differs). Technically it can’t, just as really one can’t rule out that aliens are to blame for Jesus’ missing body. Ehrman’s saying that from the perspective of historical method, given that historians make claims about the past based on observable data, nature, repeatability, etc., one cannot say the resurrection is “probable” in the sense of “likely” (“probable” is his key word). I think that’s an important distinction: I had to listen to him a few times before I caught his nuance. As a historian, he’s not saying miracles are impossible and will admit that he can’t, even if deep down he really doesn’t believe them anyway. As a historian, he has to remain neutral. Technically he’s right: if miracles do happen, then by definition they’re not probable since they’re anomalies. And just because a given explanation (e.g. miracle) is the right one doesn’t mean it’s the more probable interpretation of the available data (in theory it would if we had all the data, but we never do). That’s not to say they didn’t happen or couldn’t, but that is to say they’re not, strictly speaking, “probable.” That’s ultimately why he adopts a different interpretation of the data, one that is, strictly speaking, more probable–one that doesn’t involve miracles which are inherently improbable. He’d admit he could be wrong and that there is a probability that the miraculous interpretation could be correct and that he can’t rule it out, but he chooses the other way instead. That’s also why he stresses that, alternatively, belief in the resurrection is fine as a “theological” claim, by which he means taken on faith: faith implicitly says one is aware that the data for one’s position might not be there, or that the claim might be naturally “impossible” or unlikely, but accepts the claim anyway.
I think Ehrman is sort of right. One challenge he has, however, is that he’s left himself no viable rationale for concluding a miracle happened if it actually did: even if it did, he has to say it “probably” didn’t, and he’ll always side with “probable.” But he’d admit that just as we’re making a leap of faith that Jesus rose, at some level he’s doing likewise in saying he didn’t.
Sorry that went so long. I hope it wasn’t a waste. I didn’t really proofread this either.
August 11, 2008 at 7:12 pm
Sorry, multiple typos; thats what I get for not proof reading
August 11, 2008 at 7:11 pm
Ive watched about 35 minutes of the debate so far. I agree FTH, that some of the ways in which WLC laid out his argument are problematic. He made a lot of grand claims, quoted a minority of modern scholarship, and didn’t really address the core issues ehrman was going to raise.
That said, ehrmans argument from probablity is the arugment from Hume (the 18th century philosophy craig mentions) and it is fallacious. The problem is Itwo-fold (1) Hume begs the question by ruling out miracles al together. (2) Hume assigns a probability factor to a miracle. One cannot do this because by definition a miracle cannot be probable or improbable. A miracle, by definition, violates natural law. I can only talk about the probability of regularly occuring things; like the probability of a coin flip being 50/50. The probability of occurance for a miracle is either 100% or 0% and its impossible to assess which one of these is correct.
I cannot apply a probability to an act of will that is natural either. I cannot give a probability that you threw an ashtray and caused it to break a window. I can do forensic examination, find witnesses, ete, but I cannot assign a hard probability. Either you did it or you didnt. SO the hard frequentist probability is simply a moot point on questions of the resurrection.
I can assign a probabilty factor to the likelihood of various accounts fitting the evidence; but this is a form of Bayesian probability theory, but this allows for the resurrection as a possible conclusion. Bayesian probability simply tests internal consistancy; but it is highly subject to interpreters bias and there is debate between objectivist and subjectivist camps; the latter of which introduces a whole new array of problems.
Thats probably more information then I needed to post; but I have to agree with Craig; the resurrection cannot be ruled out by probability and I suspect that Ehrman is operating with en equivocation between frequentist and bayesian probability scales.
Pax Christi…Nick