Recently Westminster Theological Seminary released documents that were written surrounding the debate over Pete Enns’ book Inspiration and Incarnation (hereafter I&I). The last document in that large packet was an essay written by Dr. Peter Lillback, president and professor of Church History at Westminster, entitled “”The Infallible Rule of Interpretation of Scripture”: The Hermeneutical Crisis and the Westminster Standards.” The main focus of Dr. Lillback’s essay was to show how Peter Enns’ work falls outside of the Westminster Standards (at the end of the essay he “shows” how Enns violates the Standards in 7 different ways).
I have thought of different ways to respond to this essay, from an overview to a point-by-point review, and have decided to simply follow the flow of Dr. Lillback’s essay and object where objections need to be made. I would encourage everyone to read Dr. Lillback’s essay first, and then read this response. If you have not read the essay by Dr. Lillback, please do not throw in your two cents regarding this response. In my opinion, if you aren’t going to take the time to actually read the documents, then you don’t have the right to comment. I also want to apologize for the length of this post, but I hope that at least some will find it helpful as they are working through these theological issues.
To begin with, and to give the reader an orientation to the some of the comments that I will make, there are three overarching problems with Dr. Lillback’s essay that infuse the essay at various points: (1) rhetoric that is designed to garner a negative emotional response rather than to encourage critical thinking; (2) unsubstantiated claims that are designed to “dirty the water” instead of deal with the issues at hand; and (3) uncharitable, and often unfair, reading of Peter Enns’ work. The reader will see these three issues cropping up time and time again throughout this response.
Now to the response:
Introduction
From the very first sentence of the essay there is little question as to where Dr. Lillback stands on the issue. The first sentence begins with “a few shibboleths” that reveal the “strained relationship between recent biblical studies and the historical evangelical theology of Scripture” (1, page numbers refer to the numeration of Dr. Lillback’s essay, not the entire document). The first “shibboleth” is a term used by Claus Westermann (“controversial bible”), who many within the Reformed world would consider as liberal. In the footnote to this term he quotes a second passage from Richard Gaffin’s “Old Amsterdam and Inerrancy” in which Dr. Gaffin shows that Rogers and McKim’s work, The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible, calls into question the “predominating concern with inerrancy” in contemporary evangelicalism. This part of the footnote makes little sense in that it does not talk about, or use the phrase, “controversial Bible,” nor does it add anything substantial to the discussion. What it seems to convey to the reader is that to see the Bible as “controversial” is to call into question the doctrine of inerrancy. There is little other explanation as to why this section of the footnote is there.
The second “shibboleth” that is quoted is “Battle for the Bible” from Harold Lindsell’s infamous 1976 work. In the footnote to this term, Dr. Lillback once again brings up both Rogers and McKim and the issue of inerrancy. He pits Rogers and McKim against the views held by Reformed Scholasticism and cites “The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy.”
The third and fourth “shibboleths” quoted are both from I&I, “Problem of the Old Testament,” and the “messiness of the Old Testament.” The rhetorical effect of using these “shibboleths” after the two previous “shibboleths” is clear: just like a “controversial Bible” and the “Battle for the Bible” led to calling into question the doctrine of inerrancy, so do phrases just as “Problem of the Old Testament” and “messiness of the Old Testament.” These phrases also seem to be the problem raised by “recent biblical studies” that are causing a “strained relationship” between it and a “historical evangelical theology of Holy Scripture.”
So what we have in the first sentence of the essay is a rhetorical device which already equates terms from I&I with other terms that have called into question the inerrancy of Scripture. We have no substance that shows this and we have no reasoning for connecting these “shibboleths” together, except for the seemingly arbitrary choice of Dr. Lillback to string them together.
He then quotes I&I again: “Indeed, for some, “reading the Bible has already become a serious theological problem—perhaps even a crisis.”" What this conveys to the reader is that two of the four “shibboleths” that have led to calling into question inerrancy were used by Enns. Those “shibboleths” reveal a growing strain between recent biblical studies and a “”historical evangelical theology of Holy Scripture.” And now Enns is writing that reading the Bible is a “serious theological problem,” maybe even “a crisis”! This is little more than alarmist rhetoric that is aimed to, from the very outset, cause the reader to associate I&I with calling into question the inerrancy of Scripture. Let’s look at Enns’ quote with a little context: “The end result [of this book], I truly hope, will be to provide a theological paradigm for people who know instinctively that the Bible is God’s word, but for whom reading the Bible has already become a serious theological problem—perhaps even a crisis” (I&I, 15, clarification mine). Reading the quote in its context shows that Dr. Lillback selectively quoted half the sentence and then attempted to equate it with terms that call into question the inerrancy of Scripture when the sentence from which his quotation comes from declares that the purpose of Enns’ statement was to reassure struggling people that “the Bible is God’s word.” In other words, Dr. Lillback is attempting to make I&I say something that it never even attempts to say.
Dr. Lillback then follows this up with three quotes from Berkouwer. The first quotation draws a connection between “this crisis” (which Lillback does not clarify because the quote is not given clarifying context or footnote) and the development of historical criticism, “which drew attention the nature of these scriptures as human writings” (Lillback does not clarify whether the italics are original or added). What this quote does, in effect, is connect any attention on the “human” side of Scripture to an all out acceptance of historical-criticism (what aspects of historical criticism are embraced or how they are embraced is left up in the air as Lillback does not clarify). If the acceptance, or even focus, on the human side of Scripture means outright acceptance of historical criticism, then the Reformed heritage is in trouble. Herman Bavinck once wrote:
There is one mediator between God and humankind, Christ Jesus, himself human. But for that very reason his true and complete humanity is as important as his deity. (Reformed Dogmatics—Volume III: Sin and Salvation in Christ, 299).
Funny how that is never quoted in the essay, because its implications for an incarnational analogy are enormous.
The next quote from Berkouwer, which is not explained or commented upon by Lillback, equates drawing attention to the human dimension of Scripture as being a “radical question” which has a profound affect on the life of the church who as unquestionably accepted Scripture as trustworthy. How this is done is not even commented upon. It seems to be another rhetorical tool being used to cause alarm in the reader.
The third Berkouwer quote is also not commented upon, but includes the term “radical critics” who, because of the “human character” of the Bible found a right to criticize it while leaving behind infallibility, supernaturalness, and uniqueness.
Lillback makes absolutely no scholarly or reasonable effort to connect the “radical critics” of which Berkouwer speaks to Dr. Enns. Instead, he simply makes the connection and moves on in a completely unsubstantiated way.
Lillback then pleads for the reader to remember Berkouwer’s appeal to the observations of Herman Bavinck (yes, the same Herman Bavinck who is quoted above). Bavinck’s observations were that some oppositions to the authority of Scripture are not scholarly, but a result of the “enmity of the heart” within the critics of Scripture. Lillback adds after the quotation that the “hermeneutical crisis” that is upon us is not only found between orthodox Christians and secular biblical critics, but also between “those who openly profess a sincere commitment to Scripture as divine self-revelation” (2). So now, it seems, that Enns is not only being charged with calling into question inerrancy, but also as either having enmity in his heart or not openly professing Scripture as divine self-revelation. This connection is not only poor scholarship, but it is completely unsubstantiated by any argumentation, reason, or appeal to Enns’ writings. In short, it is simply a poorly constructed rhetorical device which seeks to call into question not only Enns’ beliefs, but also the spiritual fitness of his heart. Even shorter, it’s absolute nonsense.
I. The Hermeneutical Crisis, the Westminster Standards and Westminster Seminary
At the beginning of this section the question is posed, “what should we think of the Westminster Confession of Faith, the climactic statement of Reformed Theology”? (2). The question is whether this high view of Scripture, taught by a list of theologians that Lillback refers to, is still to be believed in light of this hermeneutical crisis (one that Lillback has still not defined, which leaves the reader confused as to what he is actually talking about). He goes onto quote E. J. Young, who held to the teaching of the WCF in light of scientific and critical research in his day, as well as Moises Silva (which Lillback refers to as “Moses” Silva (4)) who also held to the WCF in light of modern research. He then quotes Harvie Conn (although I’m not sure he actually understood what Conn was getting at within the context of his book) as pointing out the contextual nature of the WCF as a historical document. He then says that Conn is correct in saying that the WCF is time-bound, and then turns to a quote from Turretin which speaks of enemies within the church who bring up contradictory passages. How does this connect with anything Conn was saying? I do not know and Lillback does not clarify.
He then brings up Inerrancy and Hermeneutic which was edited by Harvie Conn and makes the statement that it “made minimal explicit reference to the Confession’s implications for the task of hermeneutics” (6). In the accompanying footnote, he points out that Conn’s essay does not include any citations of the WCF and that the entire book only cites the WCF eight times. He then includes the comment that the book also cites Bultmann eight times. Why does he include this statement about Bultmann? Does he say that they quoted Bultmann all eight times negatively or that Bultmann is very influential in the scholarship that the book was trying to address? Absolutely not. He simply adds this statement purely for rhetorical effect to “dirty the water,” if you will.
Lillback then turns to Peter Enns. In the first footnote Lillback points out that in I&I “Enns references Westminster Seminary but does not refer to the Westminster Standards.” (It was at this footnote that I began to wonder how many times Sacred Fire mentions the Westminster Standards?) Lillback then mentions that I&I “calls for a reconsideration of the evangelical doctrine of Scripture” and states that this is a “significant step beyond the perspective of Professor Conn” who ended his essay with the statement that “the Word of Our God abides forever.” Lillback then says that I&I begins with the problems of the OT, “as seen in his provocative title.” Hold the phone for a second: are we to believe that because Enns writes a book to deal with the problems of the OT then he no longer believes that the Word of Our God abides forever? There is no connection between the quotation of Harvie Conn and what Lillback is attributing to Pete Enns. Absolutely none: no reasoning provided by Lillback and no clear connection between the two.
Lillback then quotes I&I three times which shows that one of the goals of I&I was to bring the scholarship that has accumulated since the 1800’s into conversation with our doctrine of Scripture. Because Enns labels this a “crisis,” Lillback decides to follow Harvie Conn and sketch a difference between E.J. Young and Peter Enns. He writes that Young and Enns dealt with “the same “data” and “extrabiblical evidence” impacting OT scholars and their doctrine of Scripture” (9). This is a funny statement since the Dead Sea Scrolls were not even finally excavated, published, or reflected upon before the death of E.J. Young (1968). How could he have dealt with the same data and extrabiblical evidence that Enns has? Answer: he couldn’t have.
Four quotations of E.J. Young followed by a paragraph that states “there are two theologies of Scripture wrestling in the faculty room” (11) at WTS ends this section. What is not clear to this point in the essay is what the contours of either of these “two theologies of Scripture” actually are. What the reader has been presented with, to this point, is scattered quotes from I&I and past WTS faculty without explanation or examination. The only thing that is clear is that Peter Enns in the center of Lillback’s bull’s eye.
II. The Hermeneutical Crisis and the Historic Presbyterian Subscription to the Confession
Lillback begins this section with an explanation of subscription to the Confession within the contexts of the OPC, PCA, and WTS. The question to be asked, according to Lillback, is what this subscription means for those who are interpreting Scripture. This question will also cause us to ask what the interpretation of “infallible” means.
III. The Regulative Principle of Hermeneutics: The Westminster Standards’ Parameters and “Infallible” Hermeneutical Principle
This section begins with a quote from Moses Silva (whose name is actually Moises Silva) in which Silva describes the “parameters established by the Westminster Standards” (12). Silva’s quote points out that although the parameters are established by the Confession, there is freedom for “a diversity of viewpoints” within those parameters (13). This phrase is brought into question by Lillback, who wonders whether these “theological parameters” are being eroded or breached. He then quotes I&I, which states that one of Enns’ aims is to “move beyond” understanding biblical passages or stories from “within the parameters of earlier doctrinal formulations” into actually allowing them to shape “how we think about what Scripture as a whole is” (14). Lillback then chides Enns for being “vague and undefined” (14) about his definition of those parameters while praising E.J. Young for including the entire WCF chapter 1 as an appendix to his book. Chapter 1 of the WCF, as Lillback points out, is not directly addressed in I&I.
It is at this point that it becomes extremely obvious (if it wasn’t before) that Lillback is not understanding what Peter Enns is saying. Peter Enns is not talking about some “infallible rule” of interpreting Scripture that we must move beyond; rather, he is saying that what is needed is not simply interpreting Scripture within certain parameters, but actually thinking about what Scripture is. Lillback is talking about interpretation. Enns is talking about thinking about the Bible. In other words, because Lillback does not understand what Enns is actually getting at, Lillback ends up critiquing Enns via a line of thought that is utterly inapplicable to what Enns is saying.
Lillback continues on with proving that the “infallible rule” of interpretation is shown by the WCF, WLC, Turretin, and Poythress. What he misses is that they are talking about interpreting Scripture while Enns is talking about thinking about Scripture as a whole. While Lillback is talking about exegetical rules of interpreting passages of Scripture, Enns is talking about reflecting on our doctrine of Scripture. To put it another way: Lillback completely misses the mark because he is critiquing a straw man concocted by his complete misreading of Enns.
IV. Sola Scriptura: Scripture, Science, and the “Infallible Rule of Interpretation”
Lillback begins this section by reaffirming Sola Scriptura via quoting Berkouwer. He then pits Berkouwer against Enns by quoting Enns’ statement that extrabiblical evidence has become “an unavoidable conversation partner” (17), which is something Berkouwer denied. But this is completely unfair for Lillback to do. Berkouwer is talking about “science” being a “fellow interpreter” while Enns is talking about extrabiblical evidence being a conversation partner. To say that Enns is affirming what Berkouwer was denying, in this instance, is to completely misunderstand what they both are saying. Whereas Berkouwer is denying the ability of science to interpret Scripture on the same level as other parts of Scripture, Enns is simply saying that extrabiblical evidence should affect our interpretation. Enns is saying little more than that we should read the Bible in context and (his main point) to understand what the Bible is in context. He is not saying what Lillback is putting into his mouth. However, Lillback continues along this line of argumentation by quoting Berkouwer heavily.
The point Lillback is making in this section is that Scripture should be the ultimate interpreter of Scripture. He quotes Turretin and Berkouwer to show that science should never be placed above Scripture in the interpretation process. What he is missing is that Enns never affirms what Lillback is saying Enns is affirming. Once again, Enns is talking about understanding what the Bible is; Lillback is talking about interpreting particular passages of Scripture. To put it another, more terse, way: Enns is talking about a doctrine of Scripture while Lillback is talking about hermeneutics.
V. “A Modern Doctrine of Scripture”? “Provisional Theologizing” and the Confession’s “Infallible Rule of Interpretation”
In this section Lillback continues the categorical confusion in his assessment of Enns. For instance, Lillback poses the question, “Do the archaeological discoveries of scholars require a mere provisional confession of our understanding of Scripture?” (20). The problem with this line of thought is that archaeological discoveries by scholars is not the origin of the provisional nature of our understanding of Scripture. Rather, our finitude is. Lillback does not speak a word concerning the apparent differences between his epistemology, which seems to be that human knowledge of divine things can be complete, and a more humble epistemology, which Enns puts forth by realizing that our finitude means that our knowledge of divine things, such as the Bible, is never complete and never final; hence, ‘provisional.’ The only time Enns connects archaeology with this provisional nature of our knowledge of divine things is on page 49 of I&I where he talks about the impact of the past 150 years of archaeological evidence on our doctrine of Scripture. What is obvious to all, except perhaps Lillback, is that these discoveries have impacted our doctrine of Scripture: from understanding the actual texts of Scripture circulated during the second Temple Period to understanding how the Qumran community read Scripture to understanding what books they categorized or used as Scripture. All of these impact how we think about our Bible and, in some instances, how we also interpret our Bible. To say otherwise, or to act as if the opposite were true, is naive at best. Because these changes have taken place in both our understanding of what Scripture is and how to interpret Scripture, it proves Enns’ point that our knowledge of Scripture is provisional. We are finite and do not know all things. To act otherwise is to confuse our role as created beings.
The most disheartening part of this section is the first assumption that Lillback quotes from I&I. Remember in the last section Lillback charged Enns with putting extrabiblical evidence on the same level as Scripture in our interpretive process. Here is the quote from I&I (pg. 48 ) as presented by Lillback:
I assume that the extrabiblical archaeological evidence and textual evidences should play an important role in our understanding of Scripture…I reject the notion that a modern doctrine of Scripture can be articulated in blissful isolation from the evidence we have.
Lillback uses this quote to “prove” that “Enns assumes the view that both Berkouwer and Turretin have just rejected” (20), which was that “science” should put on par with Scripture in our interpretive process.
But let’s look at Enns’ quote without the ellipsis inserted to see what Lillback left out (what Lillback left out is in bold; italics original):
I assume that the extrabiblical archeological and textual evidences should play an important role in our understanding of Scripture. Ours is a historical faith, and to uproot the Bible from its historical contexts is self-contradictory. In and of themselves, these evidences are not wholly determinative; some are clearer and more relevant than others. They must be looked at carefully and patiently and thus interpreted as to their importance. Though they are not determinative, they are wholly relevant to how we understand today what the Bible is. To state the opposite, I reject the notion that a modern doctrine of Scripture can be articulated in blissful isolation from the evidence we have.
You will see, by reading the entire quote, that Enns actually denies in the ellipsis what Lillback is claiming he affirms! Enns denies that extrabiblical evidence is “determinative” of our understand of Scripture. Yet Lillback states that Enns is affirming such a view. Such a blatant misquoting and twisting of Enns’ words is irresponsible.
Lillback continues to chide Enns for his use of the term “provisional” and even questions if Enns is negating the Reformed tradition’s understanding of sola Scriptura and “the infallible rule of interpretation” (22). He questions, but never proves that this is the case….because he cannot prove it. It is, yet again, another rhetorical device used to put forth an unsubstantiated claim in order to “dirty the water.” He then quotes Young to prove that replacing these understandings of Scripture in the Reformed tradition would lead to a crossroads in theology. What Lillback has not proved, however, is that this is what Enns is doing.
Lillback then connects a quote from Enns which, in Lillback’s mind, proves that Enns is stripping the church of sola Scriptura and “the infallible rule of interpretation” (23). The quote he uses from I&I is: “In other words, there is no absolute point of reference to which we have access that will allow us to interpret the Bible stripped of our own cultural context” (in the footnote Lillback labels this quote as coming from 168-169 of I&I…it actually is found in the first full paragraph of 169). I am completely confused as to how Lillback is connecting this quote with the affirmation he thinks Enns is making. The point Enns is making, in the context of his final chapter of I&I, is that the Bible is a historical work, with a historical context, and we are historical people, living within a historical context. The two extremes we must avoid, Enns writes, are either “(1) jettisoning our context [or] (2) becoming slaves to our context” (169). The point Enns is making is nothing even close to what Lillback is presenting. Yet again, this is a complete misreading, misunderstanding, and misquotation of Enns by Lillback.
Lillback then continues by pitting sola Scriptura and “the infallible rule of interpretation” against Enns’ use of provisional. But he does this on completely unwarranted grounds. What I found humorous is that Lillback states that “all Enns leaves for the Church is “faith in God who placed us on this journey”" (23), as if that is a negative thing. Sounds a lot like “the just shall live by faith,” doesn’t it?
Lillback then claims that Enns “also seems to dismiss or redefine” (23) the evidence that Scripture and the Holy Spirit provide for our understanding of Scripture. How does Enns do this? Lillback never explains. Yet another unsubstantiated claim by Lillback with absolutely no supporting argument.
The next two pages are absolutely shocking. From the selective quoting, ellipses, and more unsubstantiated claims for rhetorical effect, it is hard to see the value in what Lillback is doing. For instance, in footnote 87 (24), Lillback brings up the point that in the phrase “word of God” the term “word” is not capitalized in I&I, yet it is capitalized in both the Latin and English versions of the WCF. Is this really the type of critique Lillback wants to put forth? That because someone doesn’t hit the shift key, then one is not in line with the WCF?
Another shocking feature is footnote 89 (24) where Lillback approvingly quotes Conn and Carson, who point out the cultural situated-ness of humanity. Conn writes, “the idea that the interpreter is a neutral observer of biblical data is a myth” (24). Wait a minute, wasn’t Lillback just taking Enns to task on the previous page (!!) for saying the same thing (i.e. that “there is no absolute point of reference to which we have access that will allow us to interpret the Bible stripped of our own cultural context” (23))? On page 24 Lillback is affirming what he just said Enns affirmed on page 23. Why is it fine when Lillback affirms it by approvingly quoting Conn and Carson, yet it is seen as replacing sola Scriptura and “the infallible rule of interpretation” when Enns affirms it?
If that isn’t bad enough, Lillback pulls two punches in footnote 90 (25). First, he opens up the footnote by claiming that even though Enns is “ostensibly distancing himself from the “openness of God” theology, p. 106, he ultimately cannot fully do so because he rejects the Confession’s “infallible principle” of Scripture interpreting Scripture” (25). Second, he equates Enns with the postmodern thought of Lyotard: “Perhaps Enns’ insistence on the primacy of the specific narrative over theological metanarrative of the Scripture’s system of doctrine as well as its infallible hermeneutic reflects the hermeneutic of Lyotard, the postmodern whose dictum is “narrative not metanarrative”" (25). Both of these connections are completely and utterly laughable, totally unsubstantiated, and unfortunate.
He then turns to a number of quotations from I&I which point out the difficulties in the Biblical text. Lillback takes these to mean that Enns is not insisting on the trustworthiness of Scripture. Yet there is nowhere in I&I where Enns makes such a claim; nowhere in his Exodus commentary where he makes such a claim; nowhere in his articles where he makes such a claim; nowhere in his teaching where he makes such a claim; the point being, Enns never says what Lillback is presenting him as saying. Yet again, another instance where Lillback is reading Enns completely unfairly, concocting rhetoric to alarm the reader, and making an unsubstantiated claim about Enns’ work.
VI. The Starting Point: A Unique Or Non-Unique Scripture?
Lillback begins this section by asking what the proper starting point for interpreting Scripture: the human or divine element? He then quotes Enns, who puts forth his incarnational analogy and affirms that Christ was 100 percent human and 100 percent divine. In a similar way, the Bible is a divine and human book. Lillback then objects to Enns because he believes that Enns does not start with the divine aspect of Scripture. What Enns writes is that the starting point for looking at the particular issues presented in the book is to realize that Scripture has a human dimension. Enns is not talking about an abstract doctrine of Scripture, as Lillback is. Rather, Enns is talking about the starting point for the particular problems that will be explored in his book. Again, Lillback’s critique suffers from a misreading of Enns’ work. He then quotes Young (footnotes 105-07), who stresses the divine origins of Scripture in his discussion on Genesis, and Carson & Helm, who critique Enns for stressing the human side of the incarnational analogy and for not engaging, specifically, the previous formulations of the doctrine of Scripture that he has problems with. One can access Enns’ responses to these critiques on his website, as he says it much better than I could.
Lillback then critiques Enns for not using the phrases “infallible,” “verbally inspired,” “verbal plenary inspiration,” “God-breathed,” “inerrant,” and, again, for not capitalizing the “W” in “word” (30). Rather, Enns focuses on using other terms in order to deal with the problems presented by critical biblical scholarship. What is interesting is that nowhere in his book does Enns deny these terms. The absence of these terms might be alarming to Lillback, but their absence does not substantiate a denial of them.
Lillback then puts forth four “consequences” that he sees from Enns’ “provisional” doctrine of Scripture. First, he sees Enns as putting forward a new definition of the Bible’s uniqueness because Enns states that the Bible is written within a historical context. This is not a new definition (cf. Bavinck’s quote above, Warfield’s use of concursus, etc.). Second, Lillback believes that Enns no longer gives us a basis for trusting our confession of Scripture. He quotes Enns who states that we should put our trust in God, who gave us the Bible, and not in our own formulations of Scripture. I think trusting God is a pretty firm basis for trusting Scripture. I’m not sure I want to have faith in my doctrine of Scripture; rather, I, like Enns, would rather put my faith in God, not in a construction of my own mind. Third, Lillback takes issue with Enns statement that Scripture is not “a timeless rule book or owner’s manual for the Christian life” (I&I, 169-70) in that Lillback believes this radically changes our understanding of ethics. He does not explain this point, so I don’t know if Lillback does believe that the Bible is a rule book and/or owner’s manual or not. Fourth, Lillback takes issue with Enns’ understanding that the OT finds its coherence in Christ and that this “christotelic coherence is not achieved by following a few simple rules of exegesis” (I&I, 170). He, once again, does not explain why he takes issue with this or what he sees as a proper response.
He ends this section with seven questions that compare Enns’ work with the Confession that will make up the entirety of the next section.
VII. Inspiration and Incarnation Contra The Westminster Standards
1. Is the Confession therefore “inadequate” if it has not thought “through this incarnational dimension” that incorporates “extrabiblical evidence”? (32)
Lillback believes that the incarnational analogy is outside of the Confession because the Confession does not use the incarnational analogy and because the Confession rejects the need for extrabiblical evidence in hermeneutics. He then states that Enns is outside of the Confession because he demands “equivalent consideration for extrabiblical evidence” (33) which is against the “infallible rule” presented in the Confession.
Two points to be made:
I. Just because the Confession does not use a term does not mean that the person who uses this term is outside of the Confession. For instance, Dr. Gaffin uses the term “fully occasional character” to refer to Paul’s writings (By Faith, Not By Sight, 6). That phrase is not found in the Confession, yet the idea plays a large role in Dr. Gaffin’s work on Paul. And no one would claim that Dr. Gaffin is outside of the Confession (unless they are a few fries short of a Happy Meal).
2. Enns does not demand “equivalent consideration for extrabiblical evidence.” As quoted above, and quoted here again, Enns views extrabiblical evidence as relevant, but not determinative (which would be “equivalent” consideration).
In and of themselves, these evidences are not wholly determinative; some are clearer and more relevant than others. They must be looked at carefully and patiently and thus interpreted as to their importance. Though they are not determinative, they are wholly relevant to how we understand today what the Bible is (I&I, 48).
In other words, Lillback’s critique is not valid. He attempts to make Enns say something which Enns does not say as well as claiming that to use terms not found in the WCF is on par with functioning outside the Confession.
2. Is the Confession’s view of Biblical “authority in continual conversation with the incarnate dimension of Scripture”? (33)
Lillback’s logic in his argumentation on this point does not make sense. He states that the Confession’s view is that the authority of Scripture rests upon God and not upon men. Also that the assurance of the truth and divine authority of Scripture come from the inward working of the Holy Spirit. Because of this, Lillback states that these points from the Confession “do not comport with the vicissitudes and variability implied by Professor Enn’s [sic] principle of “continual conversation”" (33). How do they not comport? Lillback does not explain. He merely states that there are things “implied” in Enns’ vocabulary that do not comport with the Confession. No argumentation, no logical connection, nothing. Just a statement. Yet again, we have more unsubstantiated statements.
3. Does the Confession argue for the uniqueness of the Scriptures because God therein uniquely speaks “incarnately”? (33)
Lillback states that it has already been seen that the incarnational analogy is outside of the Confession, because the Confession does not use it. He also states that some Reformed theologians are for and some are against the incarnational analogy. He then poses the question as to how Enns can make “this controverted principle the definition of the Bible’s uniqueness?” (34). He then shows that the Confession, as well as others, define the Bible’s uniqueness in terms of the divine origin of Scripture, which is the opposite of what Lillback sees Enns doing. Therefore, Lillback views Enns as being outside of the Confession.
As already noted in the response to question 1, just because the Confession does not use a term, or argue in a similar way, does not mean that the person using that term or arguing that certain way is outside of the bounds of the Confession. Also, it is the result of an unfair, or completely misunderstood, reading of I&I to conclude that Enns does not argue for the divine origin for Scripture, even in the context of the uniqueness of Scripture. For instance, when talking about the difference between ANE historiography and the historiography present in Scripture, even though they share similar characteristics, Enns writes:
What makes biblical historiography the word of God is not that it is somehow immune from such things. It is God’s word because it is—and this is how God did it (66, emphasis mine).
You see from this quote that Enns sees the uniqueness in the historiography in Scripture in that its origin is from God. It is God’s word, not because it is different from other cognate literature, but because it is God’s word. Enns everywhere presupposes the divine origin of Scripture, as he makes clear in chapter 1 (13-21).
4. Does the Confession view itself as a “provisional” confession and thus not a trustworthy guide for how “Scripture ought to be”? (36)
Lillback argues that there is no provisionality concerning “what the Word of God is” (36): it is infallible. Therefore, the rule presented by the Confession, which comes from Scripture, is equally infallible. Lillback states that Enns’ view of provisionality “is not ultimately incompatible” with the Confession because it is a subordinate standard to Scripture. But it is not compatible with “the historical Presbyterian vows to Scripture and the Confession discussed above when it is remembered that the “infallible rule” itself is not provisional” (37). He then charges Enns with being outside of the confession “on the nature of Scripture” (37) and in relation to the “infallible rule.”
Two things:
I. Enns does not argue that the nature of Scripture itself is provisional (i.e. ‘what the Word of God is’). Rather, he argues that our understanding of what Scripture is as being provisional. The difference between those two could not be more important to keep in mind, yet that difference seems to be missed my Lillback.
2. The “infallible rule” may be infallible, but that does not mean that our use or our understanding of the “infallible rule” is also going to be infallible. If it did, then we would not only have an infallible understanding of hermeneutics, but we would also have infallible exegesis. Neither are true; and neither is Lillback’s critique on this point.
5. Does the Confession prohibit viewing the Bible as a “timeless rule book…for the Christian life”? (37)
Lillback begins by saying that Enns has a “desire for a doctrine of Scripture that removes the notion of timeless truths for the Christian life” (37). This is absolutely wrong and the result, again, of Lillback’s misreading of Enns. Let’s look at Enns’ words in context:
By [trusting the Bible because we believe, by the gift of faith, in God who gave it to us], we can grow in appreciation of how very involved God has been in the lives of his people, both then and now. It encourages us to look to the Bible not as a timeless rule book or owner’s manual for the Christian life—so that we can lift verses here and there and apply them. It helps us to see that the Bible has a dynamic quality to it, for God himself is dynamic, active, and alive in our lives and in the life of his church. Although the Bible is clear on central matters of the faith, it is flexible in many matters that person to the day to day (169-70; clarification taken from preceding paragraph on 169).
As seen from this quotation, in its full context and in light of Enns’ discussion of Proverbs in chapter 3 of I&I, Enns does not deny that there are rules for the Christian life found in Scripture. To say otherwise is not only to misunderstand Enns, but to read him completely uncharitably. What Enns is combating with this statement is the “moral reading” of Scripture that happens so many times within evangelicalism. For example, some would read the story of David and Goliath and, according to the ‘rule book’ or ‘owner’s manual’ idea, come to the conclusion that God will help them face all the giants in their life. This is the type of reading that not only misconstrues the text, but also misses some of the larger points that are being made in that narrative. This is the type of reading that Enns is discouraging.
While Lillback continues listing sections of the Standards which speak of rules for the Christian life, he continues on no ground, because Enns is not saying what Lillback is presenting him as saying. It is a completely misunderstanding which renders Lillback’s critique invalid. Enns nowhere states, as Lillback believes he states, that Scripture is “without timeless truths for the Christian life” (39). I’m positive that Enns would agree that such things as “have faith in Jesus” and “don’t murder” are such timeless truths. Only a misreading and uncharitable understanding of Enns words will result in the critique that Lillback puts forth.
6. Does the Confession teach that the only dimension of the Scripture’s trustworthiness is in its specific focus on Christ, i.e., “christotelic coherence”?
While Lillback agrees that “the Christological focus of the Bible is one of the major theological paradigms advanced by the Confession” (39), he also sees, quite rightly, a doxological dimension to Scripture. He then equates Enns’ ‘christotelic’ reading of Scripture with “christonomism, that is, a Scriptural hermeneutic where only Christ is found in Scripture, without the concomitant pursuit of Christ’s glory through the new obedience of the believer” (40), which would be outside of the bounds of the Confession.
This is a funny criticism since it flies in the face of what Enns himself actually writes in his book. Completely opposite the charges of de-emphasizing “the Christian duty to obey God’s law” (40) is Enns’ concluding paragraph of I&I:
We study the Bible so we can know better who God is and ultimately what he has done in Christ. Such study, by God’s Spirit, is a means by which God forms us into the image of his risen Son, with whom we are coheirs. We must, therefore, be ever vigilant to inspect our own motives, lest we fall into the well-worn rut of thinking that the study of the Bible prepares us to lead rather than to serve. It is to learn, after all is said and done, that the most important thing is not we who read the Bible, but he who gave it to us, in all its incarnate fullness (173).
Being formed in the image of Christ, which Enns states is the end goal of studying Scripture, is hardly de-emphasizing a Christian’s duties. Lillback’s critique, on this point, is completely invalid because Lillback is critiquing a strawman of his own making and not Enns.
7. Does the Confession reject the idea that there are a few basic rules of exegesis?
Lillback opens this section with a quotation from Berkouwer, who shows that there are rules to interpretation, something the Confession also supports. He then quotes WLC 99 to prove this. He again brings up ‘christonomism’ and charges Enns with a principle that advocates that “there are not a few basic rules of exegesis to help us interpret the Scriptures clearly” (42), which is out of bounds of the Confession.
Let’s look at the quote that Lillback takes from I&I in its full context (in bold is what Lillback actually quotes):
I am very intentional here in saying that [a Christotelic reading] is something we seek after. A christotelic coherence is not achieved by following a few simple rules of exegesis. It is to be sought after, over a long period of time, in community with other Christians, with humility and patience. Biblical interpretation is, as mentioned in chapter 4, a path we walk rather than a fortress we defend. I am not ruling out, by any stretch of the imagination, an apologetic or evangelistic dimension of Scripture. I am saying that the primary purpose of Scripture is for the church to eat and drink its contents in order to understand better who God is, what he has done, and what it means to be his people, redeemed in the crucified and risen Son. Such an understanding of the purpose of Scripture—as a means of grace for the church—actually opens up possibilities of interpretation instead of closing them. Our task in biblical interpretation is to communicate the one, unchanging gospel—of what God, the creator and redeemer, has done in Christ—in such a way that respects and even expects that message to be articulated differently in different contexts.
There do not seem to be any clear rules or guidelines to prevent us from taking this process too far. But again, this is why the metaphor of journey or pilgrimage is so appealing. The path we walk may contain risks, unexpected bumps, twists, and turns. We do not always know what is coming around the corner—we were not able to anticipate the discovery of ancient Near Eastern creation texts or the Dead Sea Scrolls, for example. But yet, we have turned a few important corners over the past several generations. It is always an option, I suppose, to halt the journey and stand still, or perhaps turn around and walk back a few hundred yards, so as to stand at a safe distance from what lies ahead. We should continue the journey, however, not because we are sure of our own footing, but because we have faith in God who placed us on this journey to begin with (170-71; italics original; bold mine).
You will immediately notice that what Enns is referring to is a christotelic coherence in the first quoted section, not to the hermeneutical enterprise as a whole, which Lillback is referring to. It is also apparent that Enns is referring generally to the entire Bible, not to a specific passage, such as the Ten Commandments which WLC 99 refers to. The process to which Enns is referring, in context, is to “communicate the one, unchanging gospel—of what God, the creator and redeemer, has done in Christ—in such a way that respects and even expects that message to be articulated differently in different contexts.” Enns is talking about articulating the Gospel in different contexts, not about rules for exegesis, which Lillback is presenting him as speaking about. Lillback is not presenting what Enns is saying, but a strawman of his own making. Again, this is the result of a misreading by Lillback, which, again, renders his critique invalid.
Conclusion: Crossroads, Slippery Slope and Watershed
The crossroads of which Lillback speaks is that Enns’ work is incompatible with the Westminster Standards. The slippery slope to which Lillback refers is the slippery slope towards unbelief, which Enns, quite rightly, states he has not followed nor brought people toward. The watershed to which Lillback refers is the issue of hermeneutics, i.e., whether or not the church is going to continue following the infallible rule.
Lillback then compares and contrasts Luther with Enns: they both have had courage to stand for what they believe to be true concerning Scripture, both have stood firm in the midst of controversies, both have written about their beliefs and have been unwilling to change; yet Luther declared that his conscience was bound by the Word of God while Enns “boldly affirms” (43) that “our confession of the Bible as God’s word has a provisional quality to it” (I&I, 170). Lillback then seems to imply that Luther’s sola Scriptura is being replaced by Enns, who is pushing for Scientia et scriptura. The crossroads, watershed, and slippery slope, Lillback concludes, are created by our generation’s hermeneutical crisis. This crisis seems to be blamed on Pete Enns and those like him.
This conclusion by Lillback is completely out of turn. To even imply that Enns does not take Scripture to be the word of God or that Enns is supporting Scientia et scriptura is to completely misread and misunderstand Enns. It is an unfair and baseless critique that has a great rhetorical effect, but absolutely no substance.
In conclusion, I cannot say it better than Joel Garver has already:
Frankly, I think the essay is an embarrassment. I realize that presidents of academic institutions are often selected more for their vision or administrative skills (or even willingness to take on an unforgiving job) than necessarily their scholarship or academic rigor. Still, in my opinion, Lillback’s essay is a disservice to the integrity and reputation of WTS.
May 17, 2008 at 10:28 am
Regarding that last comment (#24). I don’t know how that icon winking smiley face thing got there. I’m not in the habit of using emoticons and am not sure what combination of keys I hit to cause that one to appear. It did not appear in my version of the text. Please disregard it.
May 17, 2008 at 10:24 am
“Perhaps it is now clear why, in my opinion, the hermeneutical flexibility that has found expression on the faculties of Old Princeton and Westminster has actually contributed to (instead of undermining) the influence these institutions have exerted with regard to the doctrine of biblical authority. Precisely because they accepted the reality of hermeneutical uncertainty, they worked especially hard to remove that uncertainty through careful exegesis.” (Moises Silva, “Old Princeton, Westminster and Inerrancy,” in B. B. Warfield: Essays on His Life and Thought, 90.)
Isn’t this the same thing as saying the work being done by all WTS faculty and even the WCF is in a very real sense provisional? Provisional in a way that someone can still take their stand on it? Isn’t this the position in which everyone inevitably finds themself? (Even me in making this assertion?)
Hey, GLW, I’m trying to work though that book you pointed me to. (I bought and am trying to work my way through the book so I could keep learning and talking with you.) I’m very busy so I don’t know how far I’ll make it, but I will read what I can and your essay is next. I must say, though, that I found this particular article (Silva’s) surprising and almost a bit startling. (Actually, I read it a long time ago, along with his presidential address to the ETS.) Silva, when I’ve been in touch with him, told me I don’t realize just how “radical” my position is. But, GLW, I see a big part of myself in his essay, too. I’d be one to never let anyone off the hook for those qualifications Silva talks about. But to me, the qualifications regarding the human authors actual intentions are so permeant that the thesis (inerrancy) suffers considerably. These are subject to readers’ preferences and perceptions just as much as any other hermeneutical endeavor, but the kicker is inerrancy tends to suggest that “obvious” readings cannot be in error-and they can be just the same-so I’m working on restating the thesis without the notion of “inerrant.”
Silva also talks about finding out what the Bible actually teaches: the Bible is inerrant in everything it actually teaches. He says this is the traditional evangelical and Reformed position. Yet the Bible rarely says, “Hey, reader! FYI, this is a myth.” Readers have to do that work on their own and through doing a load of grunt work in biblical studies some writers are saying, Gen 1-3 is a myth, the Pentateuch is historical fiction, and the Former Prophets are ideological national literature. Inerrancy is irrelevant to these claims, he says (if I understand him right). Once we decide the genre and what the text is actually teaching (the author, that is) then that teaching (IF it’s the writer’s “official” teaching) is inerrant, unless, of course, we made a mistake in discerning what scripture’s (“official”) teaching is. I am on board with this, oddly enough, but errant and inerrant are simply not helpful language for describing all this-at least not for me.
Silva says that “inerrancy does not ensure acceptance of traditional positions.” I make this point in the discursus that appears in my book, but that is only one facet of the inerrantist dilemma. I’ve tried to point out that I see the situation as much bigger than that. Could it be that inerrancy does even more than that? Could it be that inerrancy does not even ensure that the inerrancy one believes in after getting one’s feet wet in biblical studies will not be the same inerrancy one started with, but rather some other position, one best called, “trustworthy” or “reliable” or something not inerrantist? Inerrancy was stated provisionally and should now be restated without “error” and “inerrant.”
Silva says that the Warfield tradition devotes itself to “the task of knowing the unerring Scriptures so that we will not err,” but I think studying an inerrant set of scriptures shows that evangelicals have already erred by thinking “err” and “not err” are the right categories to ascribe to the authority of scripture. This may be a “radical” shift, but I think it could be restated in terms that are more sympathetic with Silva’s article (although I myself do not think that would be the best way).
May 17, 2008 at 7:38 am
Kent
Having read your book now from cover to cover I find your labelling all the defenders of the traditional doctrine of inerrancy ‘ Cartisian Foundationalists’ highly amusing-especially in reference to Cornelius Van Til and his presuppositional apologetics. Pardon me, but I don’t think you have read much of either Decartes or Van Til!
May 15, 2008 at 9:37 pm
Hi Craig:
It’s one of the best blogs out there, so I’m glad to be here when I can.
I use “postmodern” with reference to various epistemologies that have emerged in the wake of Cartesian modernism’s demise. Most of these scholars would probably admit to being postmodern if one defined it that way, thought they wouldn’t volunteer the label.
As for particular individuals, Gadamer obviously comes to mind. But one could add scholars as diverse as Polanyi, Habermas, Wolterstorff and Lonergan, to name a few.
May 15, 2008 at 3:02 pm
Kent Sparks,
It’s good to see you on this blog again. I would agree with your point from Newman. It seems counter intuitive to say we can be certain (in some kind of objective sense) and yet wrong. That’s why I point to the legal notion of beyond reasonable doubt. It’s a good example of an objective kind of certainty that is clearly not infallible.
Which postmodern writers did you have in mind? You’ll have a hard time finding postmodern writers that will admit to being postmodern
May 15, 2008 at 2:50 pm
Dr. Hart,
I apologize for not writing clearly. I’ll try to do better. One thing to note, though, is that when writing at the level of epistemology, being clear isn’t easy. I’m much more certain and clear about the truth of the WCF than I am of my epistemology. That’s one reason I’m advocating that we not deny the legitimacy of one’s subscription to the WCF because we’re not comfortable with his or her epistemology.
When you write that you’re closed with pastors or professors at reformed seminaries, I take it that you mean that a reformed seminary (and by extension a reformed denomination) has both the right and the responsibility to ensure that its professors (and pastors) are reformed. On this we agree. We might then ask what it means to be reformed. How can we spot a reformed professor or pastor? Here again I think we would agree that honest subscription to a reformed creed is a reasonable requirement for being reformed.
Where trouble begins, apparently, is when I qualify my subscription based on theological and philosophical concerns. I say things like “I hold to the WCF provisionally since it must be held subject to Scripture and since it is a human and historically situated document.” At that point, unless I’m misunderstanding you, you suspect that my subscription isn’t an honest one. You ask how I can square my understanding of provisionality and doubt with subscribing to a doctrinal statement ex animo. You wonder how I can distinguish between confessions (or interpretations of the Bible) if I claim they are provisional.
In response, I’ve tried to show that my claim that the WCF is provisional takes place in the abstract air of epistemology and shouldn’t be construed as a weakening of my subscription. I’ve argued that there is no conflict between provisionality (in this abstract sense) and certainty. I confess I’ve been a bit sloppy. I’ve settled for suggesting arguments rather than fully stating them. The reason for this is that I don’t want to wear out my welcome on this blog. My comments are already getting a bit long, and any attempt at being more rigorous will only make them longer. To compensate for this, I’ll develop the theological and philosophical concerns a bit in this comment. Then, if there’s interest, I’ll work out the marriage analogy and how the legal notion of reasonable doubt might relate to provisionality and certainty.
The theological concern is twofold. We are finite and our minds are corrupted by sin. Since we are finite, our thoughts are not God’s thoughts. When we write or confess a confession, we cannot do so from God’s point of view. Since we are corrupted by sin we are prone to idolatry and self deception in our thinking. Even good and true thoughts can be put to depraved use. For this reason, no merely human document can be final. As I’ve stated, ‘provisional’ means ‘not final’. We must acknowledge that any merely human document is incomplete, contains error and is susceptible to hiding as well as revealing. Since these are teachings in the WCF itself, it should not, in my view, be construed as a weakening of subscription vows when we apply these truths to the WCF.
The philosophical concern is similar. Descartes gives us a model of knowledge where we begin with doubt and end with apodictic certainty. Our knowledge becomes doubt proof. There’s something very seductive about this model. It seems right and has influenced much of Western thought. As many throughout history have noticed, however, this project doesn’t really work that well. On the one hand we wonder if Descartes was really able to doubt all that he said he doubted. On the other hand it’s pretty clear that Descartes cannot get from doubt to apodictic certainty without cheating a few times along the way. I would argue that this whole model is wrong headed. Apodictic certainty (certainty without any risk of being wrong) is divine, not human. If then, it is held that this kind of certainty is a requirement for an honest subscription to the WCF I would respond that I’m being asked to be God. Saying the WCF is provisional amounts to this: I’m not God and the Church isn’t God.
May 14, 2008 at 10:10 pm
Darryl and Craig:
It might assist the epistemological discussion if we consider the point of Cardinal John Henry Newman, who pointed out that “certainty” is a necessary function of the mind but is not a guarantee of correctness and knowledge. That is why we can be certain about something and also wrong about it.
It might also help to consider postmodern views of epistemic success, which are not boolean (my claims are right or wrong) but more nuanced (my claims are partly right, but also [perhaps] partly wrong).
May 14, 2008 at 9:49 pm
Craig V.: You lost me on this one. You start by talking about certainty and doubt and then you shift to openness without doubt. So are you trying to say that you are certain while being open, or that you’re certain while also provisional?
I become more confused when you refer to marriage. You’re certain about your wife, but you’re open? Open exactly to what? Other women? Of course, not. Well then, exactly how open does marriage make you if you’re no longer eligible?
It could be that marriage makes you open to what may come in marriage for better or for worse. So certainty about marriage closes you from leaving. So why wouldn’t your view of marriage also apply to subscription vows — you’re certain about the Reformed faith and closed from other traditions?
Either way, I claim a measure of certainty about the Reformed faith and am open to friends, neighbors, magistrates, writers, and car mechanics who aren’t Reformed. Where I am closed is with pastors or professors in Reformed seminaries. I don’t see how that’s objectionable. It only seems commonsensical.
May 13, 2008 at 3:58 pm
Dr. Hart,
At the risk of over simplifying, we could outline two approaches to doubt and certainty. One approach works out what we mean by ‘doubt’ and ‘certainty’ first and then applies the resulting system to human experience. The other approach looks at how ‘doubt’ and ‘certainty’ are used and tries to work out their structure from observing use. The first approach has tended to look for absolute certainty (apodictic certainty) and to see everything else as a form (or at least a justification) of doubt. The second approach tends to see ‘doubt’ functioning differently depending on context (the structure of doubt in a legal sense isn’t the same as the structure of doubt in a scientific context). The first approach holds its understanding of ‘certainty’ to be a given and interprets everything within that understanding. The second approach sees a givenness, a form of life, in various discourses and maintains that our understanding of certainty must be open to that life. The second approach will be accused of leading to relativism by its foes. The first will be accused of leading to skepticism. I, quite clearly, have much more sympathy with the second approach.
It’s the openness of the second approach that seems to cause much of the conflict. Openness, when viewed through the grid of the first approach, means doubt and uncertainty. If, however, ‘doubt’ and ‘certainty’ are worked out in the way of the second approach then there’s no conflict between openness and certainty. I can (and do) confidently affirm the WCF (and affirm that it’s better than other confessions) and at the same time speak of the provisional nature of any confession.
To make this clearer, let’s look at your questions and examples. Does the kind of openness I’ve described make it impossible for me to meaningfully take a vow? I don’t see that it would. Keep in mind, I don’t think openness (or recognizing a provisional nature to my understanding) entails doubt. As a president, to use your example, I can be strongly committed to upholding our form of government, believing in the ideals upon which it is based, and yet at the same time recognize that our form of government is not the final or absolute form of government. I may also hold that I can learn from some of the strengths of other forms of government, like monarchy, without doubting my own. Furthermore, I may believe that our form of government doesn’t work everywhere. I may conclude that the willingness to accept responsibility, needed for any form of self government, doesn’t exist everywhere.
Note that some vows, for example, marriage vows, must include both certainty (a promise or commitment) and openness (none of us knows in advance how a marriage will grow). I would argue that this is a fruitful analogy to subscription vows.
I have no problem subscribing ex animo. I’m not affirming something I doubt. I’m affirming what I strongly believe. My acknowledgement that all my beliefs are subject to my finitude and sin is not the same as saying I don’t know or believe anything. It should also be clear why I don’t see any inconsistency in preferring the work of Enns to Lindsell even though I don’t for a moment believe that either has given us the final word on Scripture.
I don’t expect agreement on what I’ve called the second approach. I suspect your own ideas are far richer than my simple outline, and I’ve seen evidence in your comments of both approaches. What I would ask you to consider is that a leaning toward something like this second approach should not be assumed to be a refutation of my subscription vows.
May 12, 2008 at 10:03 pm
P.S. Craig V., I can’t really believe you have doubts about Enns in comparison to Lindsell.
May 12, 2008 at 10:02 pm
Craig V.: I think we would likely be agreed about certainty and doubt in the abstract, or in the everyday give and take of knowing the reality around us. But it’s quite a different matter in the context of taking a vow. I don’t know how it is psychologically possible to say I’m going to uphold the U.S. Constitution as president of the U.S. but also have doubts about federalism, limited government, etc., or if I think that monarchy is really the best (albeit provisional) form of govt. In that context, the doubt could plausibly keep one from holding the office of president. In fact, I think it should. So how does your understanding of doubt and provisionality square with subscribing to a doctrinal statement ex animo, in the Thomas More, A Man For All Seasons sense, where you hold your own self and identity in your own hands and if you doubt of go against what you think is right you yourself drip away?
May 12, 2008 at 12:29 pm
Dr. Hart,
JD is correct that we need to flesh out what we mean by ‘provisional’. I would concede that I’m using it in a somewhat technical sense and that this might be confusing. I wonder if this might be one of the confusions in the WTS controversy itself, in which case, the work of clarification may reveal that one aspect of the conflict can be dissolved (I am ever the optimist). When I say that the WCF is provisional I don’t mean that I’m walking around in a state of perpetual doubt. If we were to work out an epistemology that takes into account our finitude and sinfulness (probably a little too ambitious of an undertaking for a comment in a blog) we would need to account for doubt and certainty. Let’s assume, however, that we can’t. Let’s assume that our epistemology fails at this very point. From that it would follow that my epistemology is flawed, but it wouldn’t follow that there is something wrong with my subscription to the WCF. Someone looking at me charitably might say, “Craig is a poor philosopher. He doesn’t seem to see that his epistemology leads to relativism, but that doesn’t mean he stands outside of the WCF.”
Of course, I don’t believe my epistemology leads to relativism (for me that would constitute a sufficient reason to reject it). I would argue that we do, in fact, sensibly speak of doubt and certainty even in contexts where we recognize our limitations. As an example, consider the legal notion of reasonable doubt.
By ‘provisional’ I mean ‘not final’ or ‘not absolute’. The examples I gave illustrate this. We would not claim that a given English translation of the Bible is the final translation. We wouldn’t even claim this for a text (unless we are passionate fans of Textus Receptus). Note how your piercing questions would look here. “Craig, since you hold that there is no final English translation of the Bible do you believe that all translations are equal? Do you think the Good News Bible is as good of a translation as the ESV?” Suppose I’m writing a paper for one of your classes and I’m on my third draft. I say this isn’t the final draft. Does it follow from that that all the drafts are equal? I was one of those students that couldn’t see any version of a paper as being final. They were all drafts. That doesn’t mean, however, that I wasn’t passionately committed to what I wrote.
May 11, 2008 at 11:35 am
Darry: As I’m reading the discussion above, it seems to me (and perhaps I’m wrong) that the underlying question on both sides is what does provisionality mean and under what circumstances does something go beyond being provisional to something more certain. Likewise, how do you decide the difference b/w improvement and corruption of a doctrine. I had no need to single you out. I think my question equally applies to Art, et al. I don’t know what the answer should be.
May 11, 2008 at 11:19 am
RS: That’s a bold charge. Silva’s comments–as Warfields–work only for the NT. I would encourage you to study the issues in Isaiah, Jeremiah, and the Samuels and ask what it is we’re using, why, and on what grounds it’s justified.
May 11, 2008 at 6:27 am
One has no understanding of Textual Criticism if one things the necessity of Textual Criticism automatically means the Bible is provisional. I believe Moises Silva wrote many good articles addressing this fallacy.
May 10, 2008 at 5:13 pm
JD: That Ryan Howard will come out of this slump. Is that what you were looking for? Otherwise, I’m unsure of your catechism question.
May 10, 2008 at 2:39 pm
Just one thought. I think the Bible we use is necessarily provisional. So long as there is textual criticism, especially as it pertains to the OT, the texts we use are provisional. That’s why they come with an app crit.
Darryl: Question for you. What constitutes a justified belief?
May 10, 2008 at 8:50 am
Craig V.: Okay, if the WCF is provisional I assume you’d also say the Confession of 1967 is provisional. Does that mean they are both equally true, and or equally false? Along the same lines, I assume I&I is provisional, as situated and culturally conditioned as Harold Lindsell’s Battle for the Bible. Does that mean Lindsell is as good an interpreter of the Bible as Enns?
May 9, 2008 at 7:08 pm
I’m not sure I see the problem with affirming the WCF is provisional. I assume we would agree that no English translation of the Bible is perfect. Even the Greek, Hebrew and Aramaic texts that we use for the basis of translation are not perfect. It doesn’t follow from this, however, that we can have no confidence in them or in our ability (by God’s grace) to understand, believe and obey them. I would affirm both a confidence in the WCF and an acknowledgement that this confession, like all confessions, is not a perfect interpretation of God’s Word. To say the WCF is provisional is to make an epistemic observation and isn’t necessarily tied to the passion with which I commit to the truths it affirms. I would be very nervous to find that in subscribing to the WCF I had also made a commitment to a specific epistemology.
May 8, 2008 at 10:00 pm
Art, with your humble epistemology, how do you know that Enns is right? And why doesn’t humility lead you to concede to me? That’s a way of saying that I think the appeal to humility is a side issue. Your closing quotation from Joel Garver about Lillback’s essay being an embarrassment does not suggest humility. (I’m not trying to point out a negative comment so I can gotcha. I’m simply trying to show that the appeal to humility is selective. If you want to dismiss Lillback’s essay, fine. It’s a free country. But please don’t hide behind humility in response.)
Also, on your modest epistemology, how do you know that I&I is better, more biblical — I have no idea how you’d put it — than the Westminster Confession? (You did say that Enns writes books, which are sort of like writing a confession, so the comparison is not strained.) If Enns is situated, if you are situated, if I am situated — a whole lot of situation going on — then how do you know that any book, argument, conviction is superior to another? Again, I think the appeal to provisionality is selective.
Jonathan, I think you’re right about that potential for relativism in the provisional view. I’ve been trying to get Art to see that. The old distinction between archtypal and echtypal knowledge of God would be helpful for preserving a measure of real certainty in our limited understanding of God and his ways. The provisional vs. absolute doesn’t come close to getting what’s at stake in saying that doctrinal assertions are true even if not fallible. (The irony here is that the quest for certainty is really an Enlightenment endeavor, with Nietzshean provisionality being the disillusionment that comes from not fulfilling that quest. Or so argues Alisdair McIntyre in Three Rival Versions.)
So yes, I think the Confession and Catechisms accurately depict God, man, salvation, etc. They are not infallible. They may be revised. I’m even willing to entertain the addition of “Aramaic” to chap. 1.
May 8, 2008 at 10:58 am
A sidenote, apropos of nothing in particular: Lillback asks at one point, “…what should we think of the Westminster Confession of Faith, the climactic statement of Reformed Theology?”
The mention of the WCF as a “climactic statement” reminded me of a remark by a friend many years ago that to be Presbyterian is to believe that theological orgasm was achieved in 1646 and everything since has just been cigarettes and afterglow.
May 8, 2008 at 7:48 am
And since this discussion revolves around what is “confessional” and what is not, I should also add that, as I see it, the position on ecclesiastical authority and the reformable nature of confessional statements which I have outlined above is what is implied in WCF 31.2-4.
May 8, 2008 at 7:30 am
Art and Dr. Hart,
I have stood on the sidelines and watched y’all discuss this issue a few times. Perhaps it would help somewhat if you both defined what you mean by the terms “provisional” and “absolute.” What I see in Dr. Hart’s objection to Enns’ statements that all theological statements are provisional is a fear of the danger of relativism. It seems to him that the implication here is that the Reformed understanding may in reality be no more true than the Roman Catholic, or Lutheran, or Baptist understandings. I know this is not what either Dr. Enns or Art are wanting to say, but the danger is nonetheless real and the fear is warranted. So, I think Dr. Hart’s voice should be heeded perhaps a bit more than some on the “provisional” side may be willing to listen to what he has to say.
However, what I see in proposals such as that of Enns and what Art is contending for here is something more along the lines of “reformable,” rather than what Dr. Hart sees as the implication of “provisional.” That is, they would contend that while Westminster orthodoxy is the best statement of biblical truth which the church currently possesses, this does not mean it is the final word. The church is to be continually reforming both in doctrine and practice in light of Scripture. Only Scripture, by its very nature as the Word (caps included to avoid accusations of impious motivations) of God, is irreformable. Extra-biblical theological statements, on the other hand, as representations of the church’s subjective interpretation of the only infallible rule of faith and practice, are by their very nature reformable. This does not mean they are not authoritative. But it does mean that there is room for the church to move toward progress and correction.
Is this correct, Art? If so, then I have a hard time seeing how any Protestant can object to such a stance. If confessional statements are absolutely and irreformably true, then we have no buisness being separated from the Roman communion. Magisterial Protestantism however has always held to a position of ecclesial authority somewhere between Roman tyranny and sectarian anarchy. To hold that ecclesiastical authority and confessional statements are always absolute and irreformable is to run into the error of Romanism. (And, to be clear, I really don’t think this is what Dr. Hart is doing, so I am emphatically *not* accusing him of Romanism.) To hold that there is no such thing as ecclesiastical authority and thus no validity to confessional statements is to run into the error of the sectarians. However, to hold that ecclesiastical authority, and confessional statements, possess a real, yet fallible and thus reformable authority is to simply be a Reformational Protestant. I haven’t seen Dr. Enns or Art go beyond this.
But I could be mistaken. If I am, someone please correct me.
May 7, 2008 at 10:27 pm
Dr. Hart:
Well, it led Pete to write a few books along with many essays and articles…so while you might not think that this view can lead to writing something substantial about Scripture and its interpretation, you might be wrong (cf. Pete’s Exodus commentary in the NIVAC series).
This is obviously hyperbole, but it might be getting to a major epistemological difference between us. Let me pose this question: do you think a construction produced by fallible, sin filled men (or women) can be absolute truth on the same level as Scripture?
If you answer no, then you must admit that theological constructions produced by humans are provisional (i.e. not absolute truth).
If you answer no, then I don’t see why we still bother theologizing. They got it all right in 1646, now our job is to defend what they wrote.
I’m not a church historian by any means, but didn’t Luther say that his conscience was held captive by Scripture? Or did he say that his conscience was held captive by his understanding of what Scripture was?
I don’t think this is the natural consequence of a humble epistemology. Obviously Pete is taking a stand for what he believes is true, even though he believes that his understanding of Scripture is provisional. Is he suffering from an odd from of cognitive dissonance? Or is he showing that you can hold to a humble epistemology, knowing that your understanding is always provisional because we are finite, fallen people, yet still take a stand on certain issues?
I think he’s doing the latter.
May 7, 2008 at 9:06 pm
Art, you wrote: “Enns does not argue that the nature of Scripture itself is provisional (i.e. ‘what the Word of God is’). Rather, he argues that our understanding of what Scripture is as being provisional. The difference between those two could not be more important to keep in mind, yet that difference seems to be missed my Lillback.”
How is this reassuring? Do you think that this distinction between the Bible and its interpretation would lead someone holding it to venture even to write a confession? I don’t. The logic would be something like this: we’re not sure of our interpretation of the Bible but we’re still going to spend five years writing a confession and two catechisms as part of our tribute to Sisyphus. And then when we’re done — gitty up — we’ll do it all over again because the first one was a rough draft, because all our drafts are rough.
It doesn’t seem plausible and it is an important difference between Enns and Luther. Luther didn’t think his interpretation of the Bible was provisional. You don’t say, with the threat of being burnt at the stake, “here I stand, I can do no other.” But it would make sense of saying, “here I stand, but I could also stand over there because my reading is provisional.”